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BY WAYNE P. HUGHES, JR. 
At the most fundamental level, it is accepted that the strategist di-
rects the tactician. The mission of eveiy battle plan is passed from 
the higher commander to the lower. There is no more basic precept 
than that, and no principle of war is given greater slatus than the 
primacy of the objective. 
This is not the same as saying that strategy determines tactics and 
the course of battle. Strategy and tactics are best thought of as hand-
maidens, but if one must choose, it is probably more correct to say 
that tactics come first , because they dictate the limits of strategy. 
Strategy must be conceived with battle in mind-or, as Soviet doc-
trine requires, with due regard for the correlation of forces and means 
of the two opponents. 
Strategy is paramount in determining the aims of the tactician. But 
strategy is limited by means. An assessment of means-the combat 
pmver available and its utility to achieve strategic objectives-starts 
with an adequate understanding of the tactical employment of forces 
in battle. In the golden age of naval thought before World War I, war-
fare was the subject, and strategy, tactics, and technology were de-
bated all together. 
_Tactics are the activities of forces in battle. A tactical commander 
directs these activities. One should be careful to distinguish between 
fore es on one hand and the concept of Force on the other hand. 
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Force describes forces united in action under the direction of a com-
mander, and which embody combat power. 
Force, F, is a function of forces, m, of a certain quality and quan-
tity, and their combat activities of a certain rate and coordination of 
effort. If Force, or fighting power, is directly proportional to the prod-
uct of these quantities, then the useful assertion becomes: 
F=ma 
Whether this is merely an analogy with physics, or contains the 
grains of truth, the distinction to retain is the difference between 
forces m, which is a quantity the strategist provides, and Force, F, 
which the tactical commander generates by the manner in which he 
activates--employs-his assigned forces. 1 
Recall what Clausewitz has written. He should be quoted at length 
in full context, because like the Bible, Clausewitz can be cited to make 
contradistinctive points: 
What actually halts the aggressor's action is the fear of defeat by the de-
fender's forces, [even though] he is not likely to concede this, at least not 
openly. 
One may admit that even where the decision has been bloodless, it was 
determined in the last analysis by engagements that did not take place 
but had merely been offered. . .where the tactical results of the engage-
ment are assumed to be the basis of all strategic plans, it is always pos-
sible, and a serious risk, that the attacker will proceed on that basis. He 
will endeavor above all to be tactically superior, in order to upset the 
enemy's strategic planning. The latter [strategic planning], therefore, can 
never be considered as something independent: it can only become valid 
when one has reason to be confident of tactical success .. .it is useful to 
emphasize that all strategic planning rests on tactical success alone, and 
that-whether the solution is arrived at in battle or not-this is in all 
cases the actual fundamental basis for the decision. Only when one has 
no need to fear the outcome-because of the enemy's character or situa-
tion or because the two armies are unevenly matched physically and psy-
chologically or indeed because one's own side is the stronger-only then 
can one expect results from strategic combinations alone.2 
Clausewitz dealt with ground warfare. The passage above is found 
in his discussion of defense, which he and other analysts believe is 
the stronger tactical posture on land. As will be seen, the tactical 
nature of ground-war force often differs from sea-war force. Specifi-
cally there has been no corresponding tactical advantage for the de-
fense in naval combat. Nevertheless, in this instance, what Clausewitz 
thought to be the link between tactics and strategy on the ground 
applies even more strongly at sea1 if that is possible. 
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The reason, therefore, that a discussion of tactics is appropriate in 
a book on strategy is because strategy must rest on combat power. 
One builds decisions from the bottom up: tactics affect the efficacy 
of forces, the correlation of forces reveals what strategy those forces 
can support, and a supportable military strategy governs national aims 
and ambitions . 
This is the opposite of an approach that starts with national goals 
and policies, that in due course defines military strategy, and that all 
the time takes largely for granted that the forces will be able to exe-
cute it. The top-down approach is proper for deriving force require-
ments to guide procurement policies; but force requirements, if they 
exceed existing force levels, can only be built for the future. If one is 
concerned with present strategy, he must know current capabilities 
and design his strategy accordingly. If forces are inadequate, then a 
strategy that is part bluff may be necessary, but it is important for 
the bluffing state to understand that the strategy is in fact unexecut-
able and may lead to self-delusion. Many will remember the days 
when the U.S. defense department proclaimed a 2 1/2 war strategy, 
which, in fact, was not a strategy at all but a method of sizing 
general-purpose military forces. The notion of maintaining sufficient 
general-purpose forces to fight two full-scale wars and simulta-
neously to deal with a lesser contingency lingered on long after it 
was beyond U.S . capabilities to accomplish. 
Of course, a current maritime strategy is not really so simple that 
it can be built from bottom up. The process is dialectical, with policy 
and strategy goals juxtaposed against combat capabilities. But cur-
rent strategy must derive from realistic force comparisons. 
Perhaps the pivotal nature of tactical considerations will be made 
more concrete by starting with this: It is demonstrable both by his-
tory and theory that not only has a small net advantage in Force (not, 
remember, the same as forces) often been decisive in naval battles, 
but also that the slightly inferior force tends to lose with very little to 
show for its destruction in damage to the enemy. 
At sea, there has been no counterpart to prepared positions and 
the effects of terrain, nor anything corresponding to the land warfare 
rule-of-thumb 3-to-1 attackers-to-defender ratio. There are no moun-
tains nor swamps to guard flanks, no rivers to cross or defend, and 
no high ground-except perhaps the high ground of space, which is 
common to both land and sea warfare. A fleet tactical commander 
keeps no force in tactical reserve, and all his energy is devoted to 
attacking the enemy effectively before the enemy can attack him. At 
sea, offense dominates' in a way foreign to ground commanders. When 
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a strategist's force is not competitive, he would be well advised to 
stand clear, because he will have little to show for the loss of his 
forces. 
In peacetime, every strategist must estimate the true worth of his 
nary vis-a-vis the enemy in combat or he risks deep humiliation with 
or without bloodshed. That, above all, was the lesson for Argentina 
in the Falklands War, which found its armed forces outclassed by 
those of the United Kingdom. In wartime, every strategist must know 
the relative fighting value of his nary, so carefully nurtured and ex-
pensive to build and maintain in peacetime. When committed in bat-
tle, the heart of a fleet can be cut out in an afternoon. 
If sea battles are so quick and decisive when they occur, then why 
is it that the consequences of seapower are so slow-acting? There are 
two reasons . One is that the inferior force, recognizing its inferiority 
and the probable consequences of battle, declines to fight until pressed 
by some prospective overriding consequence on land. Instead, the 
inferior nary seeks to nibble away at the enemy's control of the sea. 
The other is that the fruits of satisfactory command at sea ripen slowly. 
An abiding theme of this book is that seapower is not an end, but 
one means to the end, which is to affect events on the land. A quick 
tactical decision often entails a prolonged strategic result. 
THE TECHNOLOGY-TACTICS REIATIONSHIP: 
TWO SIDES OF ONE COIN 
Historically the inferior nary has usually been well aware of its 
strategic inferiority. Today such knowledge is not so certain. Deter-
mining the relative capabilities of modern U.S . and Soviet forces is 
particularly challenging. In part, this is because the two fleets are so 
asymmetrical in composition. We cannot compare battle lines and 
their supporting cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Much of Soviet 
seapower is represented in land-based bombers, still more in the So-
viet submarine fleet . Much of the weight of U.S. antisubmarine forces 
are P-3s, likewise based on land. Many countries have the capability 
to launch not only an air strike but also a missile attack from the 
land. Modern "coast artillery" represents a new breed of cat, reaching 
out into what used to be the exclusive domain of ships. 
The second major reason it is difficult to correlate force today is 
that there has been no major fleet action since 1945. Without battle 
we can only infer the influence of technology on tactics. It is certain 
that missile propulsion, guidance systems, satellites in the sky, nu-
clear power, computers, and a host of other developments will dra-
matically change war at sea if and when it occurs. We have only a 
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handful of clues in the public domain, however, like the damage to 
the USS Liberty by an Israeli attack, the capture of the USS Pueblo by 
the North Koreans (which was an indication of the importance of 
signals warfare and the responsibilities of command and control-
C2), and the "old fashioned" way an unopposed navy supports oper-
ations both coastal and inshore, exhibited by the Korean and Viet-
nam wars. 
For fleet actions, there are only two data points-the Israeli mis-
sile-ship battle against the Syrian and Egyptian forces in 1973, and 
the Falkland Islands War in 1982. It is not much on which to base 
far-reaching decisions regarding present tactics and future procure-
ment of ships, aircraft, sensors, and C2 systems. 
Technological change in the absence of battle testing is not new, 
however. There are remarkable parallels between the curren~ period, 
1945 to the present, and another era of vast technological progress 
from the middle of the nineteenth century to the beginning of World 
War I. That earlier period saw only the Battle of Lissa in 1866, the 
Battle of the Yalu in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, and the Battle of 
Tsushima in 1905 as major fleet actions. 
That technology would revolutionize tactics was seen by naval of-
ficers of all great powers. The implications of steam propulsion and 
its dramatic effect on tactical maneuver, the countervailing advances 
in armament and armor, the role of the ram, advances in mines and 
torpedoes, and towards the end of the period the wireless, the sub-
marine, and the aircraft, all were subjects of a great tactical debate. 
These and lesser devices wrought by technological progress were then, 
as now, imagined to carry the most extravagant implications. 
The period was also a golden age of tactical study, analysis, and 
writing, without parallel before or since. The remarkable result was 
that by the outbreak of World War I the debate, in the main con-
ducted in public, had arrived at an accurate consensus of how bat-
tleships, cruisers, destroyers, and-insofar as fleet actions were con-
cerned-submarines would be fought. Tactical study, combined with 
intensive fleet exercises, paid off. At sea, there were a few, but only a 
few, tactical surprises in World War I. 
TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY: THE OVERLOOKED CONNECTION 
On the other hand, the influence of technology on maritime strat-
egy was not only sweeping in World War I but also largely unfore-
seen. The end of the close blockade, the effect of the mine and sub-
marine on amphibious and other inshore operations, and the end of 
the surface raider as a major player in maritime warfare were antici-
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pated by a few farsighted strategists, but the full impact in World War 
I had to be discovered by trial and error and amended by fire. Even 
before the war, the shift from sail to steam had changed the nature 
of tactics enormously. But its strategic consequences were no less 
dramatic. So much were ships tied to coaling stations that it was 
often hard to say whether the fleets deployed to protect colonies or 
colonies were established to support the fleets and the movement of 
trade in the new steamships. In the North Sea, the cockpit of the 
naval war, all fleet movements were short runs governed by the lim-
ited endurance of the participants. Wireless affected the deployment 
of the fleets throughout the world, and code breaking by both the 
British and Germans repeatedly brought about or frustrated the ef-
forts of both sides to entrap the other. Finally, neither the Germans 
who conceived the first U-boat campaign, nor the British who were 
victimized by it, had manifested an inkling of understanding of the 
submarine's potential before war broke out in 1914. Fleet action was 
the full basis of strategy in the major navies of the world. While much 
brooding took place over the torpedo threat and the submarine as 
instruments that threatened battleships, the strategic surprise was 
that the submarine could serve as the replacement of the surface 
raider as a massive new threat to shipping-in the end so formidable 
that the traditional and virtually discarded means of protecting trade, 
the venerable convoy, had to be revived after a sharp and lengthy 
debate. 
Mahan, for all his wisdom, had contributed to the mistaken belief 
in the durability of strategy and its relative immunity to technological 
change. His oft quoted "from time to time the structure of tactics has 
to be wholly torn down, but the foundations of strategy so far remain 
as though laid upon a rock" went astray because it failed to distin-
guish principles from practice.3 Whether in the realm of strategy or 
tactics, there is a difference between principles and the actions that 
derive from them. Even though tactics are changed by new technol-
ogy, that does not preclude the search for tactical principles nor a 
recognition that some ways of combat abide. And if there are stra-
tegic principles, that does not mean the strategies will be unaffected 
by new technology. Strategies as well as tactics are influenced by "the 
weapons made by man . . . in the change and progress of the race." 
In fact, strategy, standing as it does above tactics, is twice vulner-
able to technological change. It is affected directly: consider, for ex-
ample, new forms of mines, first magnetic, then acoustic and pressure 
actuated, and now deep ocean mines and how they have altered the 
ways that surface warships, submarines, and merchant ships may 
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safely be employed around the world in war. Strategic weapons-
ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers-by their very name belie 
the possibility that strategy can escape basic change caused by tech-
nology. 
In addition, strategy is affected indirectly through changes in the 
form of battle tactics. Some naval examples will be revealed in due 
course. Here one might note briefly how the machine gun, a . modest 
little weapon, so enhanced the power of the tactical defense on the 
ground that it led to a shocking end to maneuver warfare on the 
Western Front in World War I. The primacy of the defense having 
been a lesson too well learned, it was implemented by new static 
fortifications, the most noteworthy of which was the Maginot Line. 
Then in 1940 tanks and tactical aircraft were married in a new con-
cept that punched holes in the defense, restored the vigor of initia-
tive and the power of the offense, and resulted in the gravest strategic 
consequences with "lightning war," the aptly named Blitzkrieg. 
It is well to consider what revolutionary strategic consequences 
new technology might have wrought since 1945, nuclear weapons 
apart. If the defense on the ground has regained much of its potency, 
the strategic implications are nearly boundless. If the potency of ma-
neuver with deep penetrations by helicopter-borne forces augmented 
by long-range missiles is ascendant, then technology may have re-
shaped not only the battlefield but also the very nature of war with 
equal drama, accompanied by a potential strategic :finality as sweep-
ing as the rapid capitulations of Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and France to the Wehrmacht. 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF TACTICS: 
TRENDS, CONSTANTS, AND CONTEXTS 
Trends. Nearly always the effect of technology is to enhance a trend 
already manifest. This may be, in the end, a better reason to study 
naval histoiy than the search for principles or constants. To see trends 
and evaluate the pace of change is the closest thing that military men 
will ever have in peacetime to foreseeing the nature of the next war, 
whether it starts tomorrow or a long time hence. These trends can 
be exposed only in an abbreviated way here. A fuller accounting may 
be found in Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice.4 Evidently the most 
basic trend is the increasing range and lethality of weapons. From 
these flow the expansion of the battlefield, the dispersal of forces 
over greater distances, the need for sensors compatible with weap-
ons' ranges, the importance of sensor countermeasures and exploi-
Strategy-Tactics Relationship 
54 
tation, and the ability to command forces over great distances with-
out giving away fatal information to the enemy. 
Constants. Yet, not evei:ything at sea is in flux . There are constants-
sturdy guides that have held so far. One, of course, is the importance 
of combat leadership and its special relationship to strategic leader-
ship. Strategists plan, tacticians do. A strategy is an ambition, a tactic 
is an activity. The strategist may expose himself and his country to 
consequences of the deepest and most far-reaching kind, but the arena 
of the tactician is one of mortal danger, of exposure to physical vio-
lence and morally debilitating chaos for himself and his comrades. 
No one should assert that the future sea battle will be more destruc-
tive than, say, those of the seventeenth century Anglo-Dutch Wars, 
but equally no one should believe that there were ever heavier de-
mands on tactical commanders and their men for sustained moral 
and physical courage than will be seen on the vast future battlefield 
at sea. We may expect a combat environment like that at Okinawa, 
when the danger of kamikaze attacks had to be endured for weeks 
on end. Or we may see a blow as sudden as that felt by the Syrian 
and Egyptian naval forces from the Israeli missile boats in 1973. 
The tactician knows he must prepare his men for rapid collective 
action. To do so in a very large organization requires continuity in 
doctrine and training. A major revision of established methods is not 
a step lightly undertaken. Looking at a lower level, battle plans can-
not be modified very many times without creating hopeless confu-
sion. The best battle plan looks almost too simple and obvious after 
the fact, but its essence is a distillation of considerations without 
end. The best strategy may be labyrinthine in its interlocking, multi-
faceted, ingenious, ambiguous intricacy. The best tactics will rest on 
elegant simplicity and clarity, achieving control, unity, and order in 
the face of the ominous potential for fear, panic, and chaos that lurks 
beneath the surface of the staunchest warrior. 
The best known of all constants is the principle of concentration. 
Its discovery as a principle of action comes at about the time two 
boys learn to pick on one. It is embodied in the unethical but prac-
tical twist, "In war, never pick on somebody your own size." Broadly 
and carefully expressed it says (as Soviet doctrine does), "concentrate 
the main effort and create superiority in forces and means over the 
enemy at the decisive place and time." At sea there is a simpler maxim, 
and one that happens to hold up even better: attack effectively first. 
The latter will be demonstrated to be a more satisfactory central and 
unifying principle than concentration when modern missile warfare 
is discussed later in the chapter. 
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Contexts. This is a book that examines the fundamentals of maritime 
strategy. In this chapter some relationships between tactics and 
strategy are assessed. In such a book, one has to deal with general 
truths couched as trends and constants. This means that the treat-
ment is constrained to remain, by and large, in the domain of theory. 
Contexts determine the particulars of a battle plan and the forms and 
patterns of specific tactics. The two orders of battle, the opposing 
missions in their larger strategic contexts, the ocean environment, 
and the proximity and influence of land-these are the great vari-
ables that cannot come into sharp focus until the eve of battle. A 
smooth transition from tactical theory to peacetime preparation to 
wartime practice depends on sound combat doctrine. 
DOCTRINE: THE GLUE OF TACTICS 
As much as can be foreseen in peacetime must be imbedded in 
doctrine, and training must be assiduously keyed to it. Doctrine in-
tegrates and institutionalizes the right combination of tactics so that 
a nation's forces will fight as a coordinated unit, with minimum sig-
nals and extemporizations during battle. When a navy's possible war-
time tasks are as sweeping as those of the U.S. Navy, the structure of 
combat doctrine is acutely difficult to formulate. 
Combat activities that cannot be doctrinally preordained and 
practiced in peacetime must be inserted into the wartime operation 
order, which is close enough to battle to remove most of the peace-
time uncertainties. In fact, an operation order, fleet fighting instruc-
tions, or a battle plan are all properly thought of as case-specific doc-
trine, applicable to an arena of war and a set of forces with tasks to 
accomplish. All these written instruments, along with the signal book 
and team training, are the means by which a commander builds tac-
tical unity into his force in advance, the way a coach unites his team 
by practice with specific plays. They are the foremost ways a com-
mander exercises command and control. 
Doctrine is one of the subtle concepts of command. Its implemen-
tation varies from country to country and service to service. In the 
United States it is best thought of as a set of policies and procedures 
followed by forces to assist in collective action. At the tactical level 
procedures dominate policies as to content. Tactical doctrine must 
never be interpreted as dogma, to be followed heedlessly. But doc-
trine must not be abandoned without justification. There is always a 
tension in the sound formulation and implementation of doctrine. 
Too tightly phrased and enforced, it stultifies initiative; too loosely 
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phrased it is a collection of useless platitudes, and when too loosely 
practiced it loses its unifying power. 
Naval history's most famous example of a departure from doctrine 
to good purpose was Nelson's at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent on 14 
February 1797. The British had a chance to split the French and 
Spanish, but if they maneuvered as a unit as required by doctrine-
the Fighting Instructions--the opportunity would be lost. Nelson, close 
to the rear of the fighting column, wore his ship out of line (thus 
turning away momentarily from the enemy) as the quickest way to 
get at the enemy and, supported by one other ship captain who saw 
what Nelson was about, independently headed off the enemy, in that 
way precipitating a victory. In those days the Fighting Instructions 
were tantamount to dogma, and Nelson's superior was John Jervis, 
notorious as a remorseless disciplinarian. Nelson had no assurance 
that Jervis would concede the primacy of tactical brilliance over good 
order and discipline in the fleet. But in this instance Nelson's move 
was so decisive and his physical courage and combat skill so mani-
fest in the outcome that Jervis-later Earl St. Vincent-was quick not 
only to forgive but to praise Nelson's boldness. 
THREE TACTICS-STRATEGY INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
We have seen that military forces are transformed into force, or 
combat power, by being put in action by command. That is why tac-
ticians emphasize not forces but the tactics those forces employ. Be-
fore the essence of naval tactics is examined, it is worth pausing to 
investigate three examples of the tactical-strategical relationship. The 
first example is in the realm of force planning, the Washington arena. 
The second deals with naval operations, the battle arena. The third 
illustrates the danger when either the strategist or the tactician lays 
his plans without due regard for the risks he may impose on his 
counterpart. 
First, in U.S. and NATO studies of the military reinforcement and 
resupply of Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s, classical convoy 
tactics were used. The escorts formed a ring around the merchant 
ships, but the ASW screens so configured could not prevent the pen-
etration of many torpedo-firing submarines. The navy's strategists drew 
the conclusion that more ASW protection should be acquired. Other 
strategists who toted up the nary's hardware bill said there must be 
a better strategy-better meaning less expensive. One solution was to 
preposition rumy divisional combat equipment in Europe and then 
fly the troops over to marry up with it. No one questioned the sound-
ness of the convoy tactics on which the gloomy losses were based 
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until the early 1970s when some work done concurrently by the Cen-
ter for Naval Analyses, the Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Atlan-
tic Fleet staff, and a small NATO study group at the headquarters of 
the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, concluded that if you opened 
out the merchant ship formation and imbedded the protection inside 
the convoys, then the losses to merchant ships would be reduced by 
a factor of two or three. Sound tactics and strategy had been inter-
woven. Suppression of submarine effectiveness at the convoys would 
reduce the rate of shipping losses, giving time for other ASW forces 
remote from the sea lanes to kill the submarines. 
The same studies of the tactical details of the convoy engagements 
revealed that the submarines ought to be able to find enough targets 
to unload all of their torpedoes on every patrol, unlike the experience 
of World War II when the average U-boat fired less than one-sixth of 
its torpedoes on a patrol. The number of torpedoes carried to sea, 
therefore, became a number of extreme importance, because esti-
mates of shipping losses over the entire campaign were in direct pro-
portion to torpedoes carried. When that fact was appreciated, intel-
ligence analysts took a more careful look at the torpedo load of enemy 
submarines and decided they had probably overestimated it, and in 
so doing overestimated the damage the submarines could do over 
their lifetimes. 
With the estimates of probable losses of merchant ships reduced 
dramatically, did convoying re-emerge as the preferred strategy? Not 
exactly, because there were too many other considerations-political, 
budgetary, and strategic-affecting the decision. The present attitude 
toward the desirability of convoying is: in some circumstances yes, in 
others, no. Here the interrelationship with strategy again enters the 
picture. If a U.S. ASW policy that emphasizes forward antisubmarine 
operations and barriers to prevent Soviet submarines from reaching 
oceanic sea lanes in significant numbers is executable, then that will 
have a powerful and positive effect to reduce the need for convoying. 
If the United States is surprised, however, as the Allies were in World 
Wars I and II, then the strategist has some assurance that the tactics 
are in hand to convoy the most vital shipping if that becomes nec-
essary. 
Secondly, consider a radically different example of the integration 
of strategy and tactics . It shows up at the interface between land and 
sea, in what felicitously has been called "littoral warfare." Navies are 
built and supported in order to influence events on land. Almost im-
possible to find is an instance of two fleets going out to fight like 
boxers in a ring, may the best ships win, and to the victor go the 
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spoils and command of the sea. Seldom has the inferior fleet failed 
to appreciate its inferiority, and so it has been only some matter of 
the gravest consequence that drew the weaker fleet into battle. 
One tactical implication is that the larger fleet in case after case 
, has been burdened with the forbidden sin of split objectives. Con-
sider the 1942-45 Pacific War. Japan or the U.S ., whichever was su-
perior and on the offensive, almost always entered into battle with 
prioritized, but nevertheless dual, missions: to shield the movement 
of some vital force and to destroy the enemy fleet. The whole Pacific 
strategy-tactics interface can be studied and understood in that con-
text. The maxim that a fleet should first gain control of the sea before 
risking an amphibious assault turned out to be impossible to follow, 
because short of the overwhelming strategic consequences of home-
land invasion, the smaller fleet would not fight. 
Now look at the sea battles in World War I-in particular, those in 
the North Sea. In this case the battles came about by some subter-
fuge, a strategic entrapment, the British hoping to lure the German 
High Seas Fleet into a death trap, and the Germans hoping to snare 
some detachments of the Royal Nary and whittle the larger fleet down 
to equality. Since neither Britain nor Germany had strategic motiva-
tion to come to battle at a disadvantage, and since the German Ad-
miral, Scheer, knew his fleet was decisively inferior, there was never 
a fight to the finish, as strategists had anticipated before the war. The 
German High Seas Fleet ended its days not with a bang, but with a 
whimper. 
As the range of weapons and sensors increased, so did the direct, 
tactical interaction between land-based and sea-based forces. There 
is no finer example than the Solomon Islands Campaign of 1942-43 
of ground, sea, and air forces all acting in unison-not coincidentally 
or serendipitously, but necessarily and vitally. A subject worthy of 
more study is the way these tactical interactions on a wider, deeper 
future battlefield will cany over into the realm of strategy and policy. 
Land-based aircraft and missiles already reach well out to sea . Sea-
based aircraft have had an influence that is well known, and now 
missiles from the sea will also play a role. One of the tactical lessons 
of the Solomons is this: do not plan to put a Marine Brigade into 
northern Norway merely to hold the land flank, but also to hold the 
maritime flank. The Marines and their accompanying air power fight 
from a vital piece of real esta!e that will support operations at sea as 
well as on the ground. It is hard to find a more apt example of littoral 
warfare in the making. 
Thirdly, ponder the problem of the U.S. Sixth Fleet Commander in 
the Mediterranean. He is vezy conscious of the need to attack effec-
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tively first, but he knows American policy is unlikely to give him the 
freedom to do so. He also appreciates that policy has often required 
a forward and exposed presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. His 
survival at the onset of war rests on two hopes to offset these two 
liabilities. The first is that he will be given the freedom of movement 
in sufficient time to take a geographical position that will make a 
major attack on him difficult. The second is that his Rules of Engage-
ment will allow him to act with measured force when certain circum-
stances demand it. Since the steps he must take are in the nature of 
denying the enemy tracking and targeting information-"anti-scout-
ing" as the term will be defined later-both the location he must take 
and actions he must be authorized to take have to be understood 
and accepted at the po1icy level. 
The modus vivendi in effect must be satisfactory both with regard 
to tactics (battlefield risks) and to strategy (political risks) . It is impor-
tant to see the conflict between the statesman's political objectives 
and the naval commander's tactical operations in a crisis. The tacti-
cian at the scene usually understands the primacy of diplomatic and 
political objectives. But an optimum political stance, such as a highly 
visible naval presence, can require a vulnerable and risky battlefield 
posture. The tactician and strategist both need agreement that to 
contain a crisis, the nation must position itself to win twice, both 
politically and on the field of battle. 
HOW TACTICIANS THINK: THE PROCESSES OF NAVAL BATTLE 
The essence of naval tactical theory is simple. It reduces to four -
statements, each describing a process. 
1. Naval warfare is attrition-centered. Attrition comes from the 
successful delivery of firepower. 
2. Scouting (to be defined momentarily) is a crucial and integral 
part of the tactical process. 
3. Command and control transform firepower and scouting po-
tential into delivered force upon the enemy. 
4. Naval combat is a force-on-force process involving, in the threat 
or realization, the simultaneous attrition of both sides. To achieve 
tactical victory, one must attack effectively first. 
Firepower, scouting, and cz are the three elements of naval forces--- • 
the means-and attrition is the great end. That is all there is to it, 
but that will prove to be enough to challenge the wiliest tactician. 
Napoleon himself knew how simple naval warfare was. Of his 115 
maxims of war, only the last three refer to naval matters. "The art of 




On the sea, nothing is genius or inspiration, everything is positive or em-
piric. The admiral needs only one science, that of navigation. The general 
needs all of the sciences, or a talent which is equivalent to all; that of 
profiting by all experience and all knowledge.5 
Every na\,)' reader will detect the irony in Bonaparte's final thrust, 
as he vented his frustration over French admirals who never seemed 
able to beat the British at sea. Yet Bonaparte was right . He saw that 
naval warfare is simpler in tactical essence and that the complexity 
arises in the execution, even as he said, "The qualities required to 
command an army are born in one, but those to command a fleet 
are obtained only by experience." It is a venerable truth that seaman-
ship was the first essential of success at sea, and in addition that "on 
the land men fight with machines, but at sea machines are fought by 
men." 
Of course, the four elements of naval combat are permuted in many 
ways, rather like physicists and engineers elaborate on and apply Sir 
Isaac Newton's laws of motion. A few of these formulations will be 
explored in order to establish the basis for richer discussions of tac-
tics-strategy interrelationships. 
TACTICIANS WIN BY ATTACKING EFFECTIVELY FIRST: 
FIREPOWER AND DEFENSIVE FORCE 
Let us shift from viewing firepower delivery, scouting, and cz as 
processes and treat them as elements of naval force. Evidently there 
is an antithesis to each. 
The antithesis of firepower is the ability to destroy the attacker's 
aircraft, missiles, or torpedoes. Call it "defensive force ." Offensive and 
defensive power could be substituted as well, but it is a useful cue 
to retain the asymmetry of defensive force as the defender's response 
to firepower. Navies historically (less evidently today) responded to 
enemy firepower by building survivability into the hulls of warships, 
which was called "staying power" in the days of 16-inch guns and 
12-inch armor belts. 
SCOUTING AND ANTISCOUTING 
In order to discuss the antithesis of scouting, termed simply anti-
scouting, it is time to define the term. Scouting is information gath-
ering by any and all means: reconnaissance, surveillance, cryptanal-
ysis, or any other type of what some call information warfare. But the 
scouting process is not complete until the information is delivered 
to the tactical commander. The correct image of a scout is 
J . E. B. Stuart riding up to Robert E. Lee and saying, "I have seen Joe 
Hooker starting to cross the Rappahannock at Germanna Ford and 
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he will not be across for three more hours." Scouting is delivered 
tactical information about the enemy's position, movement, vulnera-
bilities, strengths, and (in the best of worlds) intentions. 
Naval scouting consumes a lot of resources. A quarter, no less, 
of the British Grand Fleet and German High Seas Fleet at Jutland 
(measured in major-caliber guns) were in the two scouting forma-
tions. If Beatty had thought more of his role as scout and screen for 
the Grand Fleet and less of his own firepower, he would have saved 
Jellicoe a great deal of tension later when the High Seas Fleet hove 
into view. 
Tactical scouting consists of four elements: detection, tracking, tar-
geting, and post-attack damage assessment. The first three-detec-
tion, tracking, and targeting-form a chain, with as much redun-
dancy buiJt into the chain as possible. Anti-scouting is activity to break 
the chain, or more commonly, to retard the enemy's rate of accu-
mulating targeting information. Anti-scouting is like a handful of sand 
in the eyes. Smoke screens were an old measure used; search-radar 
jamming is a major modem method. We could call this interference 
"screening," except that screening has come to be used ambiguously, 
both as anti-scouting and as a counterforce term (viz antisubmarine 
or anti-air warfare screens). 
C2 AND C2 CM 
Command decides what is wanted from the forces, and control 
transforms the want into realization. Communications (as signals) is 
embodied in control, indeed it is the principal instrument of on-the-
scene control. C2 operates on its forces to scout, and to position and 
deliver firepower. 
Command and control countermeasures are the steps to limit the 
enemy's ability to decide (command) and disseminate decisions 
(control). For some naval officers that is an unusually narrow defini-
tion. It is not anything that needs to be explored here. What is im-
portant is to think of each tactical commander allocating his forces 
among four functions, 
Firepower Defensive force 
Scouting Anti-scouting 
Meanwhile, the enemy commander is doing the same thing. Some 
(perhaps most) weapon systems from a fleet commander's point of 
view can be used for more than one purpose, and so an allocation of 
forces among these four roles is one of his major decisions. Among 
the fascinating stories of these allocations is the evolution of U.S. and 
Japanese carrier deck loads among fighters, scouts, and bombers 
through World War II, and how the tactical commanders split their 
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assets among reconnaissance, attack, fighter escort, and combat air 
patrol. 
As the two opposing commanders make their allocations and de-
ploy for battle, they are simultaneously making positioning and tim-
ing decisions . A naval battle "starts" well before the first weapons are 
fired. Both are taking a series of steps building toward a climactic 
decision, in which the winner will be the force that attacks effectively 
first . 
MANEUVER, POSITION, FIREPOWER, AND SCOUTS 
Already the simplicity of three tactical activities-shooting, scout-
ing, and commanding-begins to seem ominously not so simple. Set-
ting aside C2 as activity (however complicated) that merely directs, 
four interrelated activities remain for C2 to orchestrate. Considering 
that the enemy commander is doing the same thing, each com-
mander has eight variables to integrate into his thinking, four that he 
normally controls and four that he will attempt to influence but that 
he cannot control. If a tactical commander's analysis admitted only 
two possible states of each variable, that is already 64 sets of circum-
stances. 
Maneuver ranked first in classical naval tactics . In fact, some have 
defined fleet tactics as maneuvers. On the ground, tactical maneuver 
must be retained as one of the indispensable elements of tactical 
thought. In modern naval combat, speed of the weapon has so come 
to dominate speed of the platform, that for the sake of simplicity and 
clarity relative position is emphasized instead. Advantageous posi-
tion, usually in terms of weapon range and sensor reach, is the cor-
rect frame of reference. Motion over time is the means, but position 
is the end. Start the tactical estimate with desired positional relation-
ships as the goal, and work back to see whether sensors and weap-
ons can be maneuvered to achieve them. 
A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF SOME TRENDS IN TACTICS 
Four things have been established. First, the strategist must know 
something about force , which is the tactician's province, as well as 
forces, which is his own. Second, future strategic decisions are af-
fected by technology just as are tactical decisions . Third, the proba-
ble effects of new technology on future war are best seen through the 
contrast between trends and constants of battle. Fourth, a structure 
for analysis, describing the processes (or activities) of combat will 
provide direction as we next examine history to discern some of the 
essential changes wrought by technology. 
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Four historical periods will be discussed, with explicit emphasis 
on the trends of the attrition process but with some salient conclu-
sions regarding the emerging importance of the scouting process as 
well. The ways and means of concentrating force will be the principal 
theme, with tempering provided by the appearance of missiles and 
modem naval tactics. The example should illuminate why "attack ef-
fectively first" is a stronger expression of the tactical aim of naval 
action than merely concentrating force. 
THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL, 1550-1810 
Because the effective range of naval gunnery was under half a mile, 
it was impossible to concentrate more than two sailing ships on one 
of the enemy. Even that was rare against a well-organized, tightly 
spaced enemy column. So concentration of firepower was built into 
the ship-of-the-line herself, by adding more decks of guns. Moreover, 
it was well understood that when both ships were handled compe-
tently, a three-decker would not only destroy a two-decker, but the 
latter would lose without having done much damage to the former. 
A 3:2 advantage in firepower was overwhelming. 
THE BIG GUN ERA, 1890-1930 
By contrast, when the effective range of guns opened to about eight 
or ten miles early in the twentieth century, it was possible to concen-
trate the firepower of the entire battle line. The focus of the tactician 
of the period was on ways to concentrate the fire of his whole line 
on a portion of the enemy's line. "Crossing-the-T" of the enemy battle 
line was the dream of every battleship admiral. Moreover, the advan-
tage did not have to last for very long. Under conditions of good vis-
ibility, a ten-minute initial advantage could be decisive. It was further 
observed that a force advantage even as small as 4:3 would be equally 
decisive. An American naval officer, Bradley A. Fiske, and a French-
man named Ambroise Baudry showed how this worked with succes-
sive salvos. A small advantage rapidly became greater as the weaker 
force sustained damage at an increasingly greater relative rate. They 
called this the N-square effect. Lanchester transformed their labori-
ous salvo calculations into simple, coupled differential equations. He 
did so merely to illustrate the principle of cumulative advantage in a 
more elegant way, using his square-law equations. Almost simulta-
neously, the Russian M. Osipov6 discovered the Lanchester form, ap-
parently on his own, and wrote sixty pages of analysis, including the 
comparison of theory with historical battles. 
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the one below. Sides A and B are two identical forces, each with the 
firepower to reduce the enemy at the rate of 10 percent every two 
minutes. The tables show that if you give side A a mere four-minute 
advantage in opening fire, side B will be destroyed while side A re-
tains more than half (57 percent) of its fighting power. 
Baudry and Fiske built similarly simple tables to show the cumu-
lative effect of preponderant force. Let A now have two warships to 
concentrate on one of B. Under the same conditions as before of 
firepower and staying power, the table of surviving fighting power 
looks like this: 
TABLE 2. 
End of SUPERIOR SIDE A SmEB 
Minute Ship A, Ship A 2 A 1 +A2 Force B Ship 
0 10 10 20 10 
2 9.5 9.5 19 8 
4 9.1 9 .1 18.20 6.1 
6 8.79 8.79 17.58 4.40 
8 8.57 8.57 17.14 2 .70 
10 8.43 8.43 16.86 1.00 
11.19 8 .38 8 .38 16.70 0 
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A "firepower kill" on Side B is achieved in only 11.2 minutes (un-
opposed it would take Side A 10 minutes). Moreover, Side A has 16.7 
or 83 percent of its fighting power remaining. If the Lanchester "con-
tinuous fire" form is used, side A's surviving fighting power is slightly 
greater, 17.3 instead of 16.7. The reason is similar to the reason that 
compounding interest daily yields slightly more return than com-
pounding annually. 
The Lanchester equations derive the results much more com-
pactly than Fiske's laborious salvo computations. The latter has one 
great advantage: it leads easily to a discussion of World War II. Say 
that one ship's salvo destroyed not 10 percent but 50 percent of an 
enemy ship's fighting strength. If A has a 2:1 advantage, B is elimi-
nated after the first salvo, of course, but he is actually more effective, 
taking out 25 percent of A's fighting strength (as against 19 percent) . 
That is because the effect of B's first-and only-salvo is greater. What 
if the possibility that B gets in an unanswered salvo first should be 
allowed? That came to be the frightening possibility of carrier warfare 
in World War II, and with even greater firepower packed in a single 
strike by a carrier air wing. 
THE AGE OF THE AIRCRAFf CARRIER 
In World War II, an attack by a carrier's air wing of dive-bombers 
and torpedo bombers had the effect of one great salvo of the whole 
of a carrier's firepower arriving at the enemy in a mighty pulse of 
destructive force. As a result, whichever carrier fleet commander at-
tacked first did great damage. So for damage assessment it was either 
A strikes B first, or 
B strikes A first, or 
A and B strike simultaneously. 
The crucial question was, how much damage could an air wing 
do? No matter how lacking the consensus before the war about bat-
tleship smvivability, by the late 1930s there was common accord that 
a CV was a vulnerable target. For the moment, we will assume that 
one carrier's air wing had the net delivered firepower to sink one 
carrier in one attack. The theoretical results are displayed in table 3: 
A STRIKES FIRST 
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When the stronger force , A, attacks first, the consequences are ob-
vious and devastating. However, when the weaker force, B, succeeds 
in attacking first , then the row "B STRIKES FIRST" demonstrates that 
the inferior force can be outnumbered by as much as 2:3, accept the 
disadvantage, and win. In effect, B achieves tactical advantage, nei-
ther by superior firepower, nor maneuver as with crossing the T, but 
by superior scouting. 
In the Pacific Ocean carrier battles in World War II, more fre-
quently than not both sides located the other and launched their 
strikes b efore the enemy attack arrived. Under the as yet uncorrobor-
ated effectiveness assumption of one-for-one, the outcome should be 
as shown in the row, "A AND B STRIKE SIMULTANEOUSLY." If w e 
inspect the A/B = 3/2 column, we may readily see the dramatic way 
the outcomes change under the "Pulsed Power" model from the 
Lanchester (continuous fire) model of naval battle. In the carrier par-
adigm, A and B both lose two carriers and the outcome leaves A 
with one carrier and B with none . If both sides had been firing con-
tinuously, then the square law would have taken effect for the supe-
rior force, and A would have destroyed B while suffering little dam-
age, expecting over two-thirds of his forces to survive (in the 
"LANCHESTER" row, see, "2.2/0"). 
What happens when force A is able to counterattack after first sus-
taining a surprise attack by B? The theoretical results (again under 
our one-for-one hypothesis) are shown in the next table. B, even when 
outnumbered 3:2 by A-a disadvantage that is overwhelming under 
continuous fire-will emerge from the battle with the same number 
of survivors ("1/1"). But, only if B was able to attack effectively first. 
Thus far the pulsed power model has been described as pure the-
ory. What are the facts? To calibrate the carrier effectiveness model, 
TABLE 4. 
RESULTS AITER A COUNTERATTACKS 
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TABLE 5. 
THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY 
(JUNE 1942) BATTLE SYNOPSIS 
INITIAL FORCES ACTUAL SURVIVORS 









review the five great carrier battles in the Pacific War: Coral Sea, Mid-
way, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz Islands, and Philippine Sea. (The 
Battle for Leyte Gulf was not carrier vs. carrier, but a series of surface 
actions, sprinkled liberally with land-based and sea-based air attacks 
on gun-ships.) None works out more handsomely than the Battle of 
l\Iidway. Table 5 shows the initial forces and final results, with air-
craft survivors thrown in for detail. (Carrier aircraft losses were brutal 
in all these battles.) The Japanese started with four carriers, and ended 
with zero, because American skill, courage, and luck produced the 
first effective attack. The U.S. Navy started with three carriers and 
ended with two. 
The results are the same as theory would have predicted when 
calibrated at the one-for-one level of effectiveness. This is shown in 
table 6. The example lets the Battle of Midway evolve as it did, in 
three steps: inferior force B (the U.S.) attacked superior A (the Japa-
nese) first and sank three carriers. After absorbing the attack, the re-
maining carrier of A counterattacked Band sank one carrier. Then in 
one final re-attack, B attacked A and sank its last carrier. 
The four other Pacific carrier battle results are similar. The pulsed 
power model, for all its simplicity, is an accurate description of the 
carrier battles in 1942, under the assumption that the net destructive 
firepower of a carrier wing had the capacity to sink one carrier in 
one attack. It may surprise some that as the war progressed, it took 
more than one air wing's attack to sink a carrier. In a mere two years, 
between December 1941 and the end of 1943, warships had built up 
their staying power and expanded their anti-air "counterforce" by 
100-fold. 
A. JAPAN (4 CV) 

















Finally, the point needs to be emphasized again that superior 
scouting was what unleashed the power of attacking first. As a de-
monstrable trend, commanders at sea in the future will need to de-
vote more and more of their time and energy to the scouting process 
as opposed to firepower delivery. 
MODERN MISSILE WARFARE 
One thing plausible, if not probable, about modem naval combat 
is that some of today's warcraft carry "more than their weight" of 
deliverable firepower. Hypothesize a missile ship that has the net of-
fensive capability to achieve a firepower kill on three identical enemy 
ships. Draw up a chart similar to the one-for-one kill capability of 
carrier air wings that were used to describe the big Pacific battles in 
World War II. 
Table 7 illustrates: 
1. What U.S. and Japanese carrier air proponents believed would 
be the effectiveness of an air strike in 1941. 
2. The often-held image of modem missile effectiveness with con-
ventional warheads at sea. 
3. The universally agreed image of modem nuclear warfare on land 
and at sea, in the absence of much improved (and some would 
say scarcely imagined) defensive force. 
A major conclusion is that when such a multiple kill capability 
exists, there are strong reasons to disperse forces and no reasons to 
mass them. The commander's goal is to concentrate firepower through 
greater weapon range and modem communications, while operating 
in a dispersed disposition. 
TACTICS AND MODERN CONVENTIONAL NAVAL COMBAT 
When the naval war is non-nuclear, the case for dispersal can be 
overstated. There is insufficient space to develop the model with its 
TABLE 7. 
INITIAL NUMBER OF SHIPS (NB) 
313 311 N/1 
A STRIKES FIRST 3/0 3/0 N/0 
B STRIKES FIRST 0/3 0/1 (N-3)/1 
A AND B STRIKE 
SIMULTANEOUSLY 0/0 0/0 (N-3)/0 
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extensive treatment of scouting on both sides, but it can be shown 
that two things continue to have a centripetal effect on naval forma-
tions in conventional war, the bread-and-butter environment of the 
great bulk of the world's warships. 
One is scouting. Aggregate scouting capacity of the force may prove 
decisive in finding the enemy first, leading to the first effective attack. 
In this instance, the aggregation of forces under a united command 
aims for superior scouting rather than superior firepower. 
The other is defense. It may be the best tactic to mass defensive 
potential-€nough to beat off any attack under the local circum-
stances in space and time. Oftentimes, the modern decision to mass 
naval components is not for the purpose of aggregating firepower, 
but to aggregate defensive force. 
As far as the U.S. Navy is concerned, its firepower is concentrated 
in very large ships. To offset the "modern missile effect," the fleet 
must have either a better firepower-scouting combination to reach 
out and strike first, or adequate defenses to stop the enemy's first 
strike with residual firepower sufficient to let a counterstrike be de-
cisive. Evidently, the modern U.S . battle fleet with its large hunks of 
firepower and strong anti-air and anti-submarine defenses has im-
plicitly adopted the second method, adequate defensive force . Here 
are four implications: 
1. The massing of battle groups in mutual support is a tactic used 
primarily for defensive reasons, or sometimes to marshal suffi-
cient surveillance and reconnaissance capability. 
2. Navy carrier battle force attacks will be overt, but will employ 
anti-targeting tactics. Usually the presence of the force cannot 
be concealed, and for defensive warning and firepower effec-
tiveness, some radiations will be made. But the tactical dispo-
sition will be masked by shrewd emission-control planning, cover, 
and deception. 
3. To see whether a carrier battle force should attempt an opera-
tion, it is necessary to correlate the force on both sides with 
competent analysis of all eight elements: comparing one's own 
firepower, defensive force, scouting, and anti-scouting capaci-
ties against those of the enemy. 
4. When the carrier battle force is not strong enough to fight its 
way in, it should not attempt the operation. 
CONCLUSION: ATTACK EFFECTIVELY FIRST 
When principles are put into practice, changes in the modes of 
warfare brought about by new technology are as apt to alter strategic 
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possibilities and constraints as those of tactics . The best way to an-
ticipate the changes is to look for trends and constants in the history 
of warfare. 
The result of one's best estimate of the way war will be fought is 
imbedded in peacetime doctrine, principally as policy at the strategic 
level and as procedures at the tactical level. The contexts of battle, 
which can only become manifest when the battle becomes imminent, 
are reflected in battle plans by whatever names they are called. 
Because war is two-sided, a battle plan must be flexible enough to 
accept tactical changes in action. The plan concerts action, but al-
lows latitude for initiative to exploit opportunity and respond to un-
anticipated threats. 
Modem tactics can be studied and battle plans formulated in the 
context of the activation and allocation of firepower and scouting 
assets by a tactical commander, who transforms forces into Force. 
Maneuver is a means to the end of establishing favorable positions 
relative to the enemy. Through C2 a tactical commander scouts and 
shoots and attempts to reduce the timeliness and effectiveness of the 
enemy's efforts . 
The trends generated by technology indicate that in future naval 
battles properly handled forces may be able to defeat more than their 
weight of enemy forces. As a result, sound scouting has been elevated 
in importance, and detection, tracking, and targeting must be treated 
by the commander as a major and integral part of the operation. Also 
as a result, classical concepts of massing firepower at sea have had 
to be reevaluated. 
It is fitting to close with reference to an article from that time 
when naval tactics and strategy were ably debated in the world's na-
val journals. In 1905 (then) Commander Bradley A. Fiske was awarded 
the Naval Institute's Prize for his essay American Naval Policy. In it, 
Fiske devoted no less than 24 of 80 pages to tactics, including the 
aforementioned rich mathematical illustration of the cumulative ef-
fects of firepower. Fiske was an archetypal modem naval leader in 
four respects: 
• He knew technology. For instance he patented plans for an aerial 
torpedo before aircraft engines were powerful enough to cariy it 
aloft. 
• He espoused tactical computations in a form that today is called 
operations analysis. 
• He argued that technology and calculations together were what 
improved tactics, and better tactics won battles. 
• He insisted that in the end the capacity to win battles determined 
a successful national strategy and policy. 
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Fiske wrote: "No naval policy can be wise unless it takes into very 
careful account the tactics that ought to be used in war; in order that 
the proper ships may be built and the proper kinds of organizations, 
drills and discipline be devised to carry those tactics into good ef-
fect." 7 
The navy has, in the last few years, revitalized interest by its officer 
corps in modern tactics, and when this interest is reduced to writing 
and transformed into better tactics, then there will be important ef-
fects on American military strategy, organization, and operations in 
peace and war. Strategy in any war rests on genuine battlefield ca-
pability, and the knowledge of who should win if battles at sea take 
place. New weapons and winning tactics are to fit like hand in glove, 
and all the military panoply of organization and training in peace-
time in the last analysis should be designed to win battles, big or -
small, fought or declined by the enemy. 
Because of the need to establish greater common ground and mu-
tual influence between tactical and strategic planning, we have ex-
amined the structure of tactics, both as to historical trends and as to 
modern practice. We have seen that the strategist supplies forces and 
aims and the tactician generates Force and results. But there are 
strategists and tacticians on both sides of a conflict. Each opposing 
tactical commander attempts to deploy his forces at sea in a coher-
ent, integrated way, each with the objective of attacking effectively 
first. 
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Naval Institute Proceedings (November 1982) . In the past half-dozen years 
there has been a resurgence of interest in tactics in our journals . Allen's 
article is representative of the best. It is a stimulating blend of strategy, tech-
nology, and fleet tactics. 
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